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Abstract 
An extended notion of binary valuation, referred to as fuzzy valuation, is introduced 
for vague or fuzzy concepts. It is shown that the behaviour of agents voting on the truth 
of sentences from a language of the propositional calculus according to such valuations 
can be described in terms of fuzzy logic. The concept of fuzzy valuation is extended to 
the predicate calculus and is shown to generate a notion of fuzzy interpretation of a 
predicate. The relationship between fuzzy valuations, fuzzy sets, random sets and mass 
assignments is explored. Finally a semantics for possibility measures based on fuzzy val- 
uations is described. © 1998 Elsevier Science Inc. All rights reserved. 
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I. Introduction 
One of the most crucial unresolved issues for the foundations of fuzzy rea- 
soning is that of the meaning of fuzzy truth values or membership functions. 
This is perhaps a controversial statement in itself since some might argue that 
the notion of fuzzy truth value is in no more need of an underlying semantics 
than is the classical notion of truth value. The problem with this view point is 
that, in practice, it seems to be inherently more difficult to assign fuzzy truth 
values to statements in a meaningful way than it is to allocate binary truth val- 
ues. This alone suggests that some more intuitive characterisation of fuzzy 
truth values is required. Such characterisations are, however, illusive mainly 
because of the need to generate a truth' functional calculus. In the sequel we 
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shall consider a particular characterisation ften referred to as the voting mod- 
el. Gaines suggests in [1,2] a semantics for the Lukasiewicz many valued logic 
L~ 1 (see [3]) based on the voting pattern of a population asked to give binary, 
'true' or 'false', responses for sentences from some language of the proposition- 
al calculus. In fact Gaines suggests this framework as a semantics for a more 
general uncertainty logic corresponding to L¢1, fuzzy logic, when; 
"members of the population each evaluated the questions according to the 
same criteria but applied a different threshold to the resulting evidence, or 'feel- 
ing'. The member with the lowest threshold would then always respond with a 
yes answer when any other member did, and so on up the scale of thresholds." 
In the following section we shall attempt to explore this idea and suggest a pos- 
sible mechanism by which such voting agents could assign truth values. This 
mechanism is analagous to that of a valuation in classical ogic but where 
the truth value assigned epends not only on the sentence but also on a param- 
eter between 0 and 1 representing the degree of scepticism of the agent. The 
closer the parameter to 0 the less sceptical the agent and the more likely they 
are to be convinced of the truth of any given statement (i.e. assign a truth value 
of t (true)) and conversely the closer the parameter to 1 the more sceptical the 
agent and the more likely they are to fail to be convinced of the truth of any 
given statement (i.e. assign a truth value off(false)). The scepticism level, then, 
should be thought of as representing an internal state of the agent according to 
which their behaviour is more or less cautious. 
2. Fuzzy valuations on languages of the propositional calculus 
Let L be a countable language of the propositional calculus consisting of a 
countable set of propositional variables PVL together with the connectives A, V 
and -~. Let SL denote the sentences of L. 
Definition 1. A fuzzy valuation of L is a function F : SL x [0, 1] ~ {t,f} such 
that VO E SL, VO ~< y < y' ~< 1 F(O,y) -- f ~ F(O, J )  = f and satisfies the fol- 
lowing: VO, ~b E SL, Vy E [0, l] 
(i) F(O A ~b,y) = t ~=~ F(O,y) = t and F(c~,y) --- t, 
(ii) F(O V ~b,y) = t ~ F(O,y) = t or F(~b,y) = t, 
(iii) F(-~O,y) = t ¢==~ F(O, 1 - y) = f . 
Notice that the treatment of negation here is somewhat strange. At first 
it seems more natural to define F such that F( -~O,y)= tc==~F(O,y )=f .  
This, however, together with the condition that VO<~y <y'~< 1
F(O,y) - - - f  =~ F(O,y')  =f  forces F to satisfy VO E SL either Vy E [0,1] 
F(O,y) = t or Vy E [0, 1] F(O,y) = f .  An obvious consequence of definition 1 
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then is that agents do not generally obey the law of contradiction or the law of 
excluded middle. Also note that i fy  is fixed at ½ then F(.,½) : SL ~ {t , f}  de- 
fines a classical logic valuation for L. Furthermore, for 0 and ~b with truth val- 
ues independent of the scepticism level, fuzzy valuations behave as classical 
valuations. 
Viewing the scepticism level as a label for an internal state of the agent we 
might interpret he above definition as follows. In order to determine a truth 
value for -~0 while in state y the agent converts to a dual state 1 - y to evaluate 
the truth value of 0. The truth value of 40 is then taken to be the opposite of 
this truth value for 0. One might regard this approach as capturing a broader 
notion of negation where the meaning of -~0 is taken to be somewhat less con- 
tradictory to that of 0 when 0 is vague than when 0 is crisp. 
The above treatment of negation may seem arbitrary but infact as the next 
result shows the assumptions that F( -~O,y)={t , f} -F (O,n(y ) )  where 
n : [0, 1] --+ [0, 1], F(-~-~O,y) = F(O,y) and the condition that VO ~<y < y' ~< 1 
F(O,y) = f ~ F(O,)/) =- f  restricts n(y) to some rescaling of 1 -y  if we insist 
that F be allowed to take any values on PVL. 
Lemma 2. For n : [0, 1] --+ [0, 1] the following are equivalent." 
(i) n is a decreasing function and Vy E [0, 1] n(n(y)) : y, 
(ii) ([0, 1], n, < ) and ([0, 1], 1 - y, < ) are isomorphic. 
Proof. See Trillas [4] or Paris [5] for an exposition. [] 
Let CI(PVL,-~) denote the closure of PVL under negation. That is CI(PVL,-~) 
is the smallest set S to satisfy PVL C_ S and V0 E SL 0 E S ~ -10 E S. 
Theorem 3. For any function F :  PVL × [0, 1] ---+ {t , f}  satisfying 
VO E SL, VO<~y < J <~ l F(O,y) = f ~ F(O,y') = f 
let the extension F + : CI(PVL,-~) × [0, 1] --~ {t,f} of f  to CI(PVL,-~) be defined 
by 
Vp E PVL F+(p,y) = F(p,y),  
VO E CI(PVL,-7) F+(-~O,y) = t ¢==~ F+(O,n(y)) = f , 
where n: [0, 1] ~ [0, 1]. Then the follow#~g are equivalent: 
(i) For all F as above F + satisfies VO E CI(PVL, 9) F+(-,-~O,y) = F+(O,y) and 
VO <~y < y' <~ 1 F+(O,y) = f ~ F+(0,y ') = f ,  
(ii) ([0, 1], n, < ) and/[0, 1], 1 - y, < ) are isomorphic. 
Proof. ((ii) ~ (i)) follows trivially from the properties of 1 -y .  
((i) ~ (ii)). Initially we show that Vy E [0, 1] n(n(y)) = y. 
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Suppose ~ E [0, 1] n(n(s)) > s then let c = (s + n(n(s))) /2 and define F such 
that for somep E PVL F satisfies Vy <~ c F(p,y)  = t and Vy > c F(p,y)  = f . The 
corresponding extension F + satisfies F+(p,s )= F(p ,s )= t since s < c and 
F+(p,s) = t=C. F+(-~-~p,s) = t=c. F+(-~p,n(s)) = f =~ F+(p,n(n(s))) = t but 
F+(p ,n (n(s ) ) )=F(p ,n (n(s ) ) )  =f since n(n(s ) )>c  giving a contradiction 
and therefore Vy E [0, 1] n(n(y)) <<.y. 
Suppose 3s E [0, 1] n(n(s)) < s then let e = (s + n(n(s))) /2 and again de- 
fine F such that for some p EPFL F satisfies Vy<<.cF(p,y)= t and 
Vy > c F(p,y) = f .  The corresponding extension F + then satisfies 
V +(p ,s )=F(p ,s )=f  since s>c  and F +(p ,s )=f=~F +(~-,p,s) =f=~ 
F+(-~p, n(s)) = t =~ F+(p, n(n(s))) = f but V+(p, n(n(s))) = V(p, n(n(s))) = t 
since n(n(s)) < e giving a contradiction and therefore Vy E [0, 1] n(n(y)) = y 
as required. 
We now show that n is a decreasing function. Suppose that n is not decreas- 
ing and that 3s, r E [0,1] where s > r such that n(s )> n(r). Then let 
e=(s+r) /2  and define F such that for some p EPVL F satisfies 
Vy ~ e F(p,y)  = t and Vy > c F(p,y)  = f . The corresponding extension F + then 
satisfies V+(p,r) = F(p,r )  = t since r < c and F+(p,r) = t =~ F+(-~-~p,r) = t =~ 
V+(--,p,n(r)) = f . Also F+(p,s) = F(p,s)  = f since s > c and F+(p,s )= 
f =~ F+(-~-,p,s) =f  =~ F+(-~p,n(s)) = t but since n(s) > n(r) this contradicts 
the property that VO ~<y < y' ~< 1 F+(O,y) = f ~ F+(O,y ') = f .  Hence n is de- 
creasing as required and the result follows immediately by Lemma 2. [] 
Now suppose that the probability distribution of scepticism levels is given by 
the probability measure # on the Borel subsets of [0, 1]. The truth degree of a 
sentence 0 relative to a fuzzy valuation F can then be defined as the probability 
that an agent has scepticism level y such that F(O,y) = t. 
Definition 4. The truth degree of 0 E SL relative to a fuzzy valuation of L, F, is 
given by 
tdF(O) = #({y E [0, 1]lF(O,y ) = t}). 
From this we obtain the following results. 
Theorem 5. Let # be symmetric about ½ so that Vx E [0, 1] #([0,x])  = #([I - x, 1]) 
and #([0,x)) = #((1 - x, 1]) then for  F a fuzzy valuation o f  L we have that 
VO E SL tdv(--,O) = 1 - tdv(O). 
Proof. VO E SL let so = SUpy~[O,l]]F(O,y)=ty here and in the sequel. Clearly then 
from the definition of a fuzzy valuation we have that either {y E [0, 1] 
IY(O,y) -- t} = [0,s0] or {y ~ [0, 1]lF(O,y) = t} = [0,s0). Here [x,x) is taken to 
denote 0. 
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Now tdF(-,O) = #({y E [0, 1][F(--,O,y) = t}) and Vy E [0, 1] F(~O,y) = t 
F(O, l - y) = f . Hence, supposing {y E [O, 1][F(O,y) = t} = [O, so] then 
F(-~O,y) = t ¢=~1 - y > so ¢=~y < 1 - s0 .  Therefore, {y E [0, 1][F(-~O,y) = t} 
= [0, 1 - so) = [0, 1] - [1 - so, 1]. Now, since /~ is a probabil ity measure and 
by the symmetry condition we have that /~({y E [0, 1] IF (~O,y)= t} )= 
1 - #([1 - so, 1]) = 1 -  #([0,s0])= 1 -  tdF(O). Similarly, i f{y E [0, 1]lF(O,y ) =_ t} 
= [0,s0) then {y E [0, 1]rF(-~O,y ) = t} = [0, 1 -So] = [0, 1] - (1 -So,  1] and 
since ~ is a probabil ity measure we have by the symmetry condition that 
#({y E [0, 1]lF(-~O,y ) = t}) = 1 -/~((1 - so, 1]) = 1 -/~([0,s0)) = 1 - tdF(O). 
[] 
Theorem 6. For F a fuzzy valuation of  L we have that 
VO, dp E SL tdF(O A c~) = min(tdF(O), tdF(C~)). 
Proof. tdF(O/X ~b) =/~({y E [13, l]]F(O,y) = t, F (~,y)  = t}) and {y E [0, 1]l 
F(O,y) = t, F(dp,y) = t} = {y E [0, 1][F(O,y) = t} M {y E [0, 1] IF(~,y) = t}. 
Now w.l.o.g suppose that So<,.s¢, so that tdr(O)~tdy(Ck). In this 
case {y E [0, 1][F(O,y) = t} N{y E [0,1][F(~b,y) = t} is given by either 
[0,s0] N [0,s0] = [0,s0] or [0,s0] N [0,s,) = [0,s0] or [0,s0) M [0,so] = [0,s0) or 
[0,s0) n [0,so) = [0,s0). For  each of  the above {y E [0,1] [F(O,y) =t ,  
F(fb,y) -- t} = {y E [0, 1][F(O,y) = t} so that tdv(O/~ 4~) = tdg(O) as required. 
[] 
Theorem 7. For F a fuzzy valuation of  L we have that 
VO, r~ E SL tdr(O V (a) = max(tdr(O), tdF(C~)). 
Proof. Follows similar lines to Theorem 6. [] 
Note that if we assume the measure p to be symmetric about ½ then the result 
follows trivially by Theorems 5 and 6 since it can easily be seen that for any 
fuzzy valuation F of  L 
Vy E [0, 1],VO, c~ E SL F(O V (a,y) = F(-~(-~O /~ -~c~),y). 
A notion of  conditional truth degree relative to a fuzzy valuation can also be 
defined as follows: 
Definition 8. For  F a fuzzy valuation of  L then tdp(.[.) : SL 2 ~ [0, 1] such that 
VO,4a E SL tdv(4~lO) = #({y E [0, 1]lF(O,y) = f or 
F(O,y) -= t,F(c~,y) = t}). 
F rom this we obtain the following result: 
Theorem 9. For F a fuzzy valuation of  L we have 
VO, ¢ E SL tdF( ¢IO) = rain(l,  1 -- tdr( O) + tdv( ck ) ). 
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Proof. 
tdp(4~[O) = #({y ~ [0, 1][F(O,y) : f or F(O,y) = t,F(c~,y) = t}) 
= #({y E [0, 1]lF(O,y) =f})  
+ ~({y E [0, 1]lF(O,y) = t,F(ck,y) = t}) 
= ~({y ~ [0, 1]lF(O,y) -- f} )  + tdF(O A ok) 
= #({y E [0, 1]lF(O,y ) = f})  + min(tdF(O), tdF(4~)) 
by Theorem 6. 
Now 
#({y E [0, 1][F(O,y) =f})  = #([0, 1] - {y E [0, 1]lF(O,y ) = t}) 
= 1 - #({y E [0, 1][F(O,y) = t}) 
= 1 - tdv(O) 
since # is a probabil ity measure on the Borel subsets of [0, 1]. Therefore, 
tdF(c~[O) = 1 -- tdF(O) + min(tdF(O), tdF(CP)) 
= min( l ,  1 -- tdF(O) + tdF(4~)). [] 
A corresponding measure of  equivalence is given in the following definition. 
Definition 10. Let F be a fuzzy valuation of L then the equivalence degree 
relative to F is a function eqF : SL 2 ~ [0, 1] such that 
VO, dp ~ SL eqr(0 , tp) : #({y E [0, 1]lF(O,y ) = F(~,y)}) .  
Theorem 11. For F a fuzzy  valuation on L we have 
V O , c~ eqF ( O , ?p ) = 1 -- max ( tdF ( O ) , tdF ( ~ ) ) + min ( tdF ( O ) , tdF ( d? ) ) . 
Proof. 
eqF(0, ~) ---- #({y E [0, 1]lF(O,y ) = t,F(d?,y) = t}) 
+ ~({y ~ [0, 1]IF(0,y) -- f ,  F(4' ,y) = f} )  
-- tdv(O A ~b) +/~([0, 11 -- {y E [0, 1]lF(O,y ) = t or F(d~,y) = t}) 
-- tdR(O A ~) + 1 - #({y e [0, l l IF(O,y) 
= t or F(dp,y) : t}) 
since/~ is a probabil ity measure on the Borel subsets of  [0, 1]. 
= tdF(O A (a) + 1 -- tdv(O V ~b) 
= 1 - max(tdr(O), tdF(dp)) + min(tdF(O), tdF(~)) 
by Theorems 6 and 7. [] 
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Notice that 1 - eqF is a special case of the distance metric defined by Gaines 
in [1] and tdF(. I.) is a special case of his conditional measure. Furthermore, we 
have the relationship 
tdF(dplO ) = eqF(0, 0 A ~b). 
Also notice that an alternative definition of conditional truth degree can be giv- 
en by the probability that an agent has a scepticism level Y such that 
F(~b, Y) = t given that he has a scepticism level Y for which F(O, Y) = t. In oth- 
er words, 
tdF(O A ~) 
tdF(qblO ) = Probr(F(tp, Y) = tlF(O, Y) = t) - 
tdF(O) 
Hence, by Theorem 6 it follows that 
tdF(q~lO ) tdF(dP) - tdF(O) if tdF(C~) <~ tdF(O), 
= 1 otherwise. 
This corresponds to the implication operator in Godel's many valued logic (see 
[3]). 
Now a truth function for a many valued logic on L is a function 
t : SL ~ [0, 1] satisfying V0, ~b E SL 
(i) t(-~O) = 2~(t(0)), 
(ii) t(O A q5) = 2^(t(0), t(qS)), 
(iii) t(O V (9)= 2v(t(O),t(q~)) for some fixed functions 27: [0, 1] ~ [0, 1], 
2 . :  [0, 1] z ~ [0, 1] and 2v: [0, 1] 2 ~ [0, 1]. 
Clearly for a fuzzy valuation F of L, if tt is symmetric about ½ then by Theorems 
5-7 tdF is a truth function for a many valued logic on L where 27 (x) = 1 - x, 
2A(x,y) = min(x,y) and 2v(x,y) = max(x,y) these being the Lukasiewicz con- 
nectives. The cases of implication and equivalence, however, are less straight 
forward. For instance, although VO, d? E SL tdF(c~[O ) = 2~(tdF(O),tdF(c~)) 
where 24 (x, y) = min(1, 1 - x + y) (i.e. the corresponding Lukasiewicz connec- 
tive) tdF(.I.) is a conditional truth degree rather than a truth degree of condi- 
tionals. In otherwords, tdF(d?lO ) describes a relationship between the voting 
behaviour of the population with respect o 0 and the voting behaviour with 
respect o ~b where 0 and 4) are sentences of L, a language with only the con- 
nectives A, v and -~. If  voting populations are to model a many valued logic 
with implication one would seem to require that 24 be in some way character- 
istic of the voting behaviour when the voting agents are presented with a con- 
ditional (i.e. 0 ~ q~) and asked to make a binary decision. More precisely, 
suppose that we extend the language L by adding the connective ~ and let 
L* denote this language. We require then an extended efinition of fuzzy valu- 
ation so that 
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vo, 4~ c st* ta~(o ~ ~) = ~_(ta,~(o),tadr))  
and where 
tdF(O ~ ~b) = #({y E [0, 1]IF(0 ~ O,y) = t}). 
In order to obtain the Lukasiewicz implication operator the most natural way 
of extending the definition of fuzzy valuation is as follows: 
V0,~b E SL* F(O --~ ~b,y) = t ~ F(O,y) =f or 
F(O,y) = t,F(c~,y) = t. 
In this case, however, the condition that V0 E SL*,VO~<y <3/~< 1
F(O,y )=f~F(O,y ' )=f  forces F to satisfy VOESL* either VyE[0,1] 
F(O,y) = t or Vy E [0, 1] F(O,y )=f .  This, of course, gives us that V0 E 
SL* tdF(O) C {0, 1}. 
Now there are other ways of extending the definition of fuzzy valuation to 
include implication. The most obvious, perhaps, is 
Vy E [0, 1] F(O --+ c~,y) = t ¢==¢, F(-~O V c~,y) = t 
which, of course, has the advantage that we can take A, V and -, as primitives 
and define ~ in terms of them. In this case, assuming # is symmetric about ½, 
we obtain 2_.(x,y)= max(1 -x ,y )  which is not the Lukasiewicz connective. 
Indeed it is difficult to see how the notion of fuzzy valuation can be extended 
to implication to generate the full Lukasiewicz logic L~,. 
Some further insight can be gained into the notion of fuzzy valuation by 
considering the following characterisation. 
Definition 12. Let FALSE:[O, 1] ~ 2 sL such that if 1 ~>y~ >y/> 0 then 
FALSE(y) C_ FALSE(d) and VO, ~b E SL, Vy ~ [0, 1] 
(i) 0 A qb E FALSE(y) ¢=~ 0 E FALSE(y) or ~ E FALSE(y), 
(ii) 0 V ck E FALSE(y) ¢==~ 0 E FALSE(y) and q~ E FALSE(y), 
(iii) -~0 E FALSE(y) ¢==~ 0 ~ FALSE(1 - y). 
Here FALSE(y) is taken be the set of sentences of L deemed to be definitely 
false at level of scepticism y so that if a sentence is false at level of scepticism y 
then it is false for all levels of scepticism greater than y. Notice that condition 
(i) of the above definition is stronger than we might expect from classical logic 
since, for example, 0 A -10 E FALSE(y) only if either 0 E FALSE(y) or 
-~0 E FALSE(y). This could be viewed as a more cautious approach to deciding 
if a conjunction isdefinitely false. Part (iii), the case of negation, can be justified 
in the following manner; the lower the level of scepticism at which an agent be- 
comes convinced that -10 is false the higher the level at which he becomes con- 
vinced that 0 is false since the former provides additional evidence against he 
latter. 
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Now if we define F : SL × [0, 1] ~ [0, 1] such that 
VO E SL, Vy E [0, 1] F(O,y) = t if 0 ~ FALSE(y) 
= f otherwise, 
then it can easily be seen that F is a fuzzy valuation. Furthermore, F(O,y) = t 
and F(O,y) = f can be interpreted as 0 is possibly true and 0 is definitely false 
at scepticism level y respectively. 
The model of voting agents described in this section assumes that at any giv- 
en instant an agent applies the same level of scepticism in order to evaluate the 
truth value of any sentence of L. That is V0 E SL an agent A assigns a truth val- 
ue of t to 0 if and only i fF(O,y)  = t where y is A's current scepticism level. Now 
there are two possible justifications for such a model. The first is that each 
agent is characterised by a value quantifying their general propensity towards 
scepticism. The second justification is that for all agents cepticism levels vary 
according to the context in which they find themselves but for any given con- 
text a particular level applies. Now clearly neither of these justifications i ad- 
equate if we are to regard our model as a complete description of human voters 
when questioned on vague concepts. For instance, quite obviously there must 
be a highly complex relationship between assigned truth value, social context, 
personality and the meaning of any sentence under consideration. However, if 
viewed as a crude caricature of human voting behaviour it does seem that this 
model has some intuitive appeal. For example, it is not uncommon to classify 
human personalities as either generally optimistic or generally pessimistic. Fur- 
thermore, it seems in principle possible to order social contexts in terms of the 
general levels of caution that they generate. 
Despite these arguments, however, it seems difficult to justify the symmetry 
condition on # required for Theorem 5. In particular, if scepticism levels are 
dependent on personality traits then there seems no reason to suppose qual 
tendencies towards pessimism and optimism across the population. 
In Section 3 we extend the notion of fuzzy valuation to languages of the 
predicate calculus and consider its relationship to fuzzy set theory, mass assign- 
ment theory and possibility theory. 
3. Fuzzy valuations on languages of the predicate calculus 
Although it is in principle possible to define fuzzy valuations for general lan- 
guages of the predicate calculus we shall, for the sake of simplicity, limit con- 
sideration to quantifier f ee languages of the following form. For some universe 
f2 let L be a language of the predicate calculus consisting of a set of unary re- 
lation symbols RL together with constant symbols {at[t E f2}, the connectives 
A, V and -~ and a single variable x. For elegance of notation we shall tend 
not to distinguish between an element of O and it's corresponding constant 
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symbol. Let PL, predicates of L, be those well formed formulae containing the 
uninstantiated variable x and let SL denote the sentences of L (i.e. those well 
formed formula with no uninstantiated variable). As for the propositional cal- 
culus case a fuzzy valuation of L and a truth degree relative to that valuation 
are defined in the following manner. 
Definition 13. A fuzzy valuation of L is a function F : SL × [0, 1] ~ {t, f} such that 
VO E SL, V0~<y<y'~<l F(O,y) = f ~ F(O,y') = f 
and satisfies the following: V0, 4) E SL, Vy E [0, 1] 
(i) F(O /x 49,Y) = t ¢=~ F(O,y) = t and F(~b,y) = t, 
(ii) F (OV q~,y) = t c==~ F(O,y) = t or F(dp,y) = t, 
(iii) F(~O,y) = t ¢==~ F(O, 1 - y) = f . 
Definition 14. The truth degree of a sentence 0 E SL relative to a fuzzy valuation 
of L, F, is given by 
tdF(O) = #({y E [0, 1][F(O,y) = t}). 
3.1. Random sets and fuzzy  sets 
A fuzzy valuation of L together with a predicate of L naturally generates a 
consonant random set corresponding to a notion of fuzzy interpretation of the 
predicate, and a fuzzy set. 
Definition 15. Let B be a a-algebra on the universe U1 and A be a ~-algebra on 
the universe U2 then R is a consonant random set from (UI,B) into (UE,A) if 
R: U1 ~ U2 is a B -  A measurable function such that Vu, u 'E  U1 either 
R(u) c g(u') or R(u') c R(u). 
For a good introduction to random set theory in uncertain reasoning see 
Goodman and Nguyen [6]. 
The classical notion of an interpretation of some predicate of L is as the set 
of elements for which the predicate is true. Now we can use the concept of fuz- 
zy valuation to extend this notion to that of a fuzzy interpretation of a predi- 
cate at a certain scepticism level. More formally; 
Definition 16. Let F be a fuzzy valuation of L and P E PL then the fuzzy 
interpretation of P generated by F is a function IP] F : [0, 1] ~ 2 a such that 
Vy E [0, 1] [p]F(y) = {a E (21F(P(a),y) = t}. 
I f  we allow P to vary across PL then the function [.]F. : PL x [0, l] --* 2 ~ can 
be viewed as a fuzzy interpretation of L and satisfies the properties: 
VP, Q E PL, V0<~y~<y'~ 1 
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[ej Cv ') ¢ [,,jr(v), 
[~P]FCv ) = f2 -  [P]F(1 --y), 
[P A Q]%v) = [e] Cv) n [Q]%v), 
[P V Q]F(y) = [p]F(y) U [Q]F(y). 
This is interesting since it suggests a possible definition of a vague predicate in 
terms of the variability of it's meaning. In otherwords, a predicate is said to be 
vague if the interpretation of P varies independently of changes in background 
knowledge regarding P. For example, we use the word tall to mean different 
things at different imes and in different contexts whereas the word square 
has a fairly fixed meaning. In the current context, then, the variability depends 
only on the scepticism level of the agent. 
Lemma 17. Let B be a a-algebra on U1 and A be a a-algebra on U2 generated 
by C c_ U2 then the function R: U1 ~ U2 is B -A  measurable iff 
VS E C R-I(s) E B. 
Proof. See Cohen [7]. [] 
Theorem 18. Let d be the minimal a-algebra of 220 containing all sets of the 
form {S E 2a[T M S ~ ~} for T C (2 (i,e. ~¢ = a({{S E 2OIT M S ~ O}[T C O})) 
and ~ denote the a-algebra of Borel subsets of [0, 1] then for P E PL and F a 
fuzzy valuation of L, [p]F is a consonant random set from ([0, 1], ~) into (22°, ~1). 
Proof. Now by the definition of fuzzy valuation it is easily seen that 
O<~y<~y'<~l [p]F(y,)C [p]F(y). 
Furthermore, 
g T C Q [P]F-I({s E 2alTnS--/: 0}) = {y E [0, 1]lTn [p]F(y) # 0}. 
Now VTCf2 TM[p]F(y)¢O =#Vy'<.yTM[p]F(y')¢O and hence if s= 
supy~[0,111rniel,(y)#~v then Vy < s TM [p]V(y) ¢ 0 and Vy > s Tn  [p]V(y) = 0. 
Therefore, either {y E [0, 1]lTn [P]e(y) ¢ 0} = [0,s) or {y E [0, 1]lTn [P]•(y) 
¢ 0} = [0,s]. In each case {y E [0, 1]{Tn [p]F(y) ¢ O} E ~. Hence since ag is 
the a-algebra generated by the class {{S E 2a[T M S ¢ 0}IT _C Q} then by lem- 
ma 17 [pjr is ~ - -  d~ measurable and hence  [p]r is a consonant random set. 
[] 
A fuzzy valuation of L together with a formula of L naturally generates a 
fuzzy subset of f2 as follows: 
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Definition 19. Let P E PL and F be a fuzzy valuation of L then pr  : f2 --, [0, l] is 
a fuzzy subset of 12 such that 
Va E f2 PF(a) = tdF(P(a)) = p({y E [0, 1]la E [p]F(y)}). 
Theorem 20. Let P, Q E PL and F be a fuzzy valuation of L then if l~ is symmetric 
about I the following hold." 
(i) Va E ~ (P A Q)FF(a ) = min(pF(a), QF(a)), 
(ii) Va E t2 (P V Q) (a) = max(Pr(a), QF(a)), 
(iii) Va E [2 (~P)F(a) = 1 -PF(a).  
Proof. It can easily be seen that Theorems 5-7 can be extended to truth degrees 
on the language of the predicate calculus L. In this case the result follows 
trivially from Definition 19. [] 
Theorem 21. Let f be a fuzzy subset off2 then for any P E RL provided # is such 
that #([0,x]) is a continuous function of x there exists a fuzzy valuation F on L 
such that 
Va E f2 pF(a) = f(a) .  
Proof. Since #([O,x]) is a continuous function ofx we have by the properties of 
probability measures that VxE [0,1] #([O,x])=#([O,x)) so that by finite 
additivity Vx E [0, 1]/~({x}) = O. Therefore, #([0, 0]) = 0 and #([0, 1]) = 1. 
Hence, given continuity we have by the intermediate value theorem that 
Va ~ I2 3Ca E [0, 1] /~([0, Ca]) = f(a).  
Therefore, if we define F such that 
Va E t2 F(P(a),y) = t ¢=:¢, y<~ ca 
then 
Va E f2 pF(a) = f(a)  
as required. [] 
We now explore the relationship between fuzzy interpretations of a predi- 
cate relative to a fuzzy valuation of L and the commonly used concept of ~-cut. 
Definition 22. (i) The y'th 0t-cut of a fuzzy set f denoted fy is given by 
fy = {x E t2[f(x) >1 y}. (ii) Let Int(fy) = {x E alf(x) > y}. 
Theorem 23./f /~ = 2, the lebesgue measure on [0, 1], then for F a fuzzy valuation 
of L and P E PL we have that 
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Vy E [0, l] Int(pFy ) C_ [p]FCv ) _C pry. 
Proof. Clearly since/~ = 2 we have that Va E O pF(a) = SUpyetO,111ae[PlF(y)y and 
therefore 
and 
Yt E [O, 1] Int(P~t ) = {a  E f2 [ sup y > t} 
yE [0, l][ae[p]F(y) 
/~F~ = {a E K21 sup y~t} .  
y6[0, I l taE [P]F (y ) 
Now suppose a E [P]F(t) then supye[O, lllae[elrev)y >i t=~ a E Pt F and there- 
fore [P]F(t) C_Pt F. On the other hand suppose a EInt(Pt F) then 
SUpye[O,l]lae[p]F(y)y > t =~ 3s > t such that a E [P]F(s) ~ a E [P]F(t) since Vs > 
t [P]F(s) C_ [P]F(t). Therefore, Int(Pf) C_ [P]F(t). [] 
3.2. Mass assignments and possibility measures 
The notion of mass assignment for finite universes was first proposed by 
Baldwin (see [8,9]) as a generalisation of Shafer's basic probability assignments 
(see [10]) permitting the allocation of non zero mass to the empty set. A general 
definition valid for infinite universes is as follows: 
Definition 24. A function M:  d ~ [0, 1] is a mass assignment if M is a 
probability measure on (22°, d ) .  
Clearly the probability distribution of a random set from ([0, 1],~) into 
(22~, d )  is a mass assignment. Now a fuzzy valuation F of L together with a 
formula P of L naturally generate a mass assignment, denoted M F, where 
M ff is the probability distribution of the fuzzy interpretation of P, [p]e, gener- 
ated by #. More formally the definition is as follows: 
Definition 25. Let F be a fuzzy valuation of L and P E PL then the mass 
assignment relative to F generated by P is a function M F : ~ ---, [0, 1] such that 
vA e d M;(A) = e [0, 1]liPid(y) e At). 
From this it can easily be seen that 
Va E (2 pF(a) = MF({s E 2al a E S}). 
In [1 l] Zadeh introduces the notion of a possibility distribution based on fuz- 
zy sets. The idea is essentially that statements of the form X is f ,  where X is a 
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random variable and f is a fuzzy set, induce a possibility distribution on X. 
In fact the meaning of such statements, referred to as fuzzy events, is taken to 
be that the possibility distribution of X is the membership function of f .  As a 
semantics for either fuzzy set theory or possibility theory this characterisation 
is inadequate since in our view neither the notion of graded membership or 
that of graded possibility can be taken as primitive. In the sequel we describe 
how fuzzy valuations naturally generate possibility measures and how this 
framework provides some insight into the meaning of fuzzy events. Initially, 
however, we give the definition of a possibility measure on a a-algebra (see 
[12,131). 
Definition 26. Let B be a a-algebra of some universe U then a possibility 
measure on (U,B) is a function Pos : B ~ [13, 1] such that 
(i) Pos(0) = 0, 
(ii) Pos(U) = 1, 
(iii) If {Si}i~l is any countable sequence of sets in B then Pos(UiE ~ Si) = 
suPieiPos(Si). 
Now for a fuzzy valuation F of L and predicate P of L consider the following 
measure. 
Definition 27. For F a fuzzy valuation of L and P E PL then PosF(.IP) : 
2 ~ --* [0, 1] is a function such that 
VT c PosF(rlP) ---- C [0, 1]13a T F(P(a),y) = t}). 
Now clearly this measure can be expressed in terms of mass assignments since 
{y E [0, 1]13a E T F(P(a),y) = t} = {y E [0, 1]l[P]F(y) f]T ~ 0) 
= {y E [0, I]I[pIF(y) E {S E_ (JlS M T # •}} 
so that 
VT C_ f2 Post(TIP) = MF({s C_ OlS M T ¢ 0}). 
Definition 28. Let f be a fuzzy subset of f2 then f is normalised iff 
SUPxEof(x ) = 1. 
Lemma 29. Let f  : S --~ [0, 1] and W : [0, 1] ~ [0, 1] such that Wis a continuous 
and increasing function on [0, 1] then 
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Proof. Let b ~ SUPx~sf(x ) then Ve > 0 ~c E S such that If(x) - b[ < e since 
otherwise 3E > 0 Vx E S If(x) - b[ > e =~ b - f (x)  > e ~ f(x)  < b - e which is 
a contradiction. 
Hence, by continuity of W we have that Ve > 0 ~ E S [W(f(x)) - W(b)[ < 
and since W is increasing ~ W(f(x)) > W(b) - ~. 
Also, since W is increasing it follows that sup~csW(f(x)) <~ W(b). Now sup- 
pose SUpxcsW(f(x)) < W(b)and let W(b) - SUpxesW(f(x)) -- A > 0 then by the 
above ~]x E S such that W(b) - W(f(x)) < ~ =~ W(f(x)) > supxesW(f(x)) 
which is a contradiction. [] 
Theorem 30. Let F be a fuzzy valuation on L and let # be such that #([0,x]) is a 
continuous function of x then for any P E PL 
VT ~ 2 ~ PosQTIP) - sup Pr(a). 
acT 
Proof. 
VT E 2 ° Post(TIP) = #({y E [0, 1]13a E T F(P(a),y) -- t}). 
Now 
and 
{y ~ [0, 1]13a E T F(P(a),y) = t} = U{Y E [0, 1][F(P(a),y ) = t} 
acT 
[0, sup "~ C_ E [ sup y]j y_ {y [0, 1]]F(P(a),y) = t} C 0,yjF(P(a),yl= t 
y]F(P(a),y)=t ] 
therefore 
sup y] 
YlF(P(a),Y) =t 2 I acT aET YIF(P(a),Y) =t 
so that 
aer ylF(P(a),y)=t ,] act L act ylF(P(a),y)=t J 
Now by the continuity of/~ we have that 
p([O, sup sup y~ =p( IO ,  sup sup y]~. 
acT ylF(P(a),y)=t )] J \ L acT y[F(P(a),y)=t ] ] 
Therefore, 
[ acT ylF(P(a),y)=t J 
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and again by the continuity of # and lemma 29 we have that 
L aET y[F(e(a),y)=t J aET ylF(P(a),y)=t j acT 
as required. [] 
Corollary 31. Let F be a fuzzy valuation on L and let # be such that #([0,x]) is a 
continuous function of x then for any P E PL the following are equivalent: 
(i) Posr(.I P) is a possibility measure on (t2, 2a). 
(ii) pF is a normalised fuzzy set. 
Proof. ( i i )~  (i). Follows trivially from Theorem 30 and Definition 26. 
(i) ~ (ii). 
By Theorem 30 it follows that 
VT E 2 a POSF(TIP) = sup pF(a) 
aET 
and since Pose(.lP) is a possibility measure then by Definition 26 
Post(alP) = sup pF(a) = 1. [] 
aEt2 
Notice that providing # is continuous in the above sense then by Theorem 21 
we have that for any possibility measure, Pos with a corresponding possibility 
distribution (i.e. Pos is such that VS~ O Pos(S)= supa~sf(a ) where 
f :  Q--+ [0, 1]) we can find a fuzzy valuation F of L such that for some 
P E PL Posr(.JP) = Pos. 
Given the above results a natural question is whether we can relate the no- 
tion of possibility given in Definition 27 to the more classical and less contro- 
versial notion of possibility. The classical notion of possibility can be stated as 
follows. For events El and E2 from some sample space we say that E2 is pos- 
sible given that E1 has occurred if and only if E1 and E2 are compatible (i.e. 
El n E2 # 0). Hence, in the current context we might define a classical possibil- 
ity measure on (t2,2 ~) as a function Poss(.t. ) : 2 ~ × 2 ~ ~ {0, 1} such that 
VS, TE2  aPoss(SIT )=1 i fSNT#0,  
= 0 otherwise. 
Clearly then any event of the form X E T where X is a random variable into 
and T c_ ~ naturally generates a classical possibility measure of the above kind 
on (~, 2a). Now suppose we are told by an agent that P(X) holds where 
P E PL. The most obvious interpretation of this statement is that X E [p]r(y) 
where y is the agents cepticism level. Thus provided we know the value of y 
and the f ru~zy valuation F then this information generates a possibility measure 
Poss(.l[P ] (y)). If on the other hand y is unknown to us but we know the 
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distribution of scepticism levels # then we might take the expected value of 
Poss(.l[P]e(y)) as y varies as a measure of the possibility of any set. That is 
VS C_ O Post(SIP) = E~(Poss( SI [P]r ( Y) ) ) = 
Now 
and 
Poss(SI[p]F(Y)) = 1 if Sn [p]F(y) # 0 
= 0 otherwise, 
S N [p]F(y) # 0 ¢=~ 3a E S F(P(a),y) = t. 
Therefore, 
f POss(S[[p]F(Y))d/~= f d# 
[0,1] {yE[O,1]l~laES F(P(a),y)=t} 
Poss(SI [P]P(Y)) d#. 
[o,1] 
= p({y E [0, 1]13a e S F(P(a),y) = t}). 
The model of fuzzy reasoning presented in this paper is based on a particular 
interpretation of what is meant by vagueness. More specifically, we regard 
vagueness as uncertainty of meaning so that a statement such as Bill is tall is 
perceived to be vague simply because its precise meaning is unknown. Clearly 
the uncertainty is not total since otherwise the statement would be incompre- 
hensible but nevertheless it does exist. A possible source of such uncertainty 
is the fact that a word or concept like tall is used to mean different hings by 
different individuals and in different contexts. One might suppose that such 
variability of meaning in a language could result from the need to describe a
world of unbounded complexity in terms of statements ofbounded complexity. 
A consequence of this viewpoint is that at the time of utterance we are assum- 
ing that an agent has a precise meaning of tall in mind. This should be contrast- 
ed with the commonly held view within the approximate r asoning community 
that a vague concept has an intrinsically imprecise meaning. 
The concept of fuzzy interpretation discussed in this section embodies the 
above notion of vagueness although the variability of meaning here is of a par- 
ticularly restricted form. In this case the variability depends olely upon the 
scepticism level of the agent so that an interpretation of a predicate changes 
only in its relative degree of specificity or generality. Now it might be argued 
that such a restriction is difficult to justify given that the variability of meaning 
in natural anguage is likely to take a much more general form. We would re- 
spond to such a criticism in two ways. Firstly, in keeping with the comments at 
the end of Section 2, this model is clearly unsatisfactory if regardedas a com- 
plete description of human behaviour relating to vague concepts. On the other 
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hand, if it is viewed as a crude approximation capturing some specific harac- 
teristics of vagueness in natural anguage then it is not without intuitive appeal. 
Secondly, the purpose of this work is primarily to suggest a possible semantics 
for fuzzy logic and although other models of variability of meaning may be in- 
tuitive there is no reason why, in general, they will result in truth functional ca- 
lculi. 
4. Conclusions 
Assuming symmetry of the measure ~the notion of fuzzy valuation provides 
a characterisation f voting agents whose behaviour can be described in terms 
of fuzzy logic with the Lukasiewicz connectives for 2^, 2v and 24. The exten- 
sion of this concept o languages of the predicate calculus generates a notion 
of fuzzy interpretation which, to some extent, captures the intuitive idea that 
vagueness corresponds to variability of meaning. The fuzzy interpretation of 
a predicate is a consonant random set the distribution of which is a mass as- 
signment. Finally it can be shown that, assuming some predicate and fuzzy val- 
uation, a possibility measure on the universe f2 is generated from a classical 
possibility measure by taking it's expected value as the scepticism parameter 
varies. 
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